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“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in the mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get 
their footing first in that way, namely, by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be 
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for 
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.”1 
 
“In the new economy, it is as important to have access to a basic 
bank account and financial services as it is to have access to 






The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) creates a Hobson’s choice: one 
must either struggle to function in modern society without a bank 
account or submit to financial surveillance by the government. Both 
 
* Jeremy Ciarabellini is a graduate of Seattle University School of Law where he 
earned both a Juris Doctor (2015) and an L.L.M in Innovation and Technology 
Law (2018). He specializes in electric transmission law and finds additional 
academic interests in privacy law and brain–computer interface law. Jeremy 




1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). 
2 Michael A. Stegman, Banking the Unbanked: Untapped Market Opportunities 
for North Carolina’s Financial Institutions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 23 (2001) 
(citing Lawrence H. Summers, Helping Americans To Save More, Remarks at the 
Choose to Save Forum (April 2, 2000)).  
 Seattle J. Tech., Envtl. & Innovation Law               [Vol. 10:1 
 
136 
choices result in drastic consequences. The following two stories 
illustrate these consequences.  
 
A. Story One 
 
Ariel Schwartz tried to live without a bank account for a 
single day.3 As part of a simulation to determine what it is like to 
function without a bank account, Ariel had two hours to purchase 
and load a prepaid card, cash both a payroll and a personal check, 
send those checks, pick up a money transfer, and finally pay rent.4 
Ariel described this simulation as an “exhausting experience.”5 
The first payday loan and cash advance business Ariel tried 
to use refused to cash her checks. The business turned her down 
because it could not readily verify that the checks were legitimate. 
A second business was willing to cash the checks but for a 
“significantly higher fee;” however, that same business refused to 
let her pay $10 of the rent bill for “unspecified reasons.”6  
 Ariel then went to Western Union to send and receive her 
money transfers. There, she could not receive funds, being told by 
Western Union that part of its system was down.7 However, while 
Western Union did allow Ariel to send a money transfer of $30, it 
concurrently imposed a $5 fee.8 In the two-hour deadline, these were 
all of the tasks that Ariel was able to complete.9 
 
B. Story Two 
 
Ken Quran immigrated to America to provide for his 
family.10 Over the next seventeen years, Ken owned and worked in 
his convenience store.11 Despite working seventy hours per week, 
Ken and his family had time to become American citizens.12 
During his seventeen-year career, Ken saved $150,000 for 
his retirement, “[b]ut his American dream [became] a legal 
 
3 Ariel Schwartz, What It’s Like to Live Without A Bank Account For A Day, FAST 
CO. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3039201/what-its-like-to-
live-without-a-bank-account-for-a-day [https://perma.cc/XYS8-JT5G]. 






10 Nick Sibilla, How An Obscure Banking Law Let The IRS Seize Bank Accounts 










nightmare.”13 Ken’s bank reported him to the government because 
it believed that he was violating the anti-structuring provision of the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) because of how Ken was withdrawing cash 
from his account.14 Ken did not know that his actions could be seen 
as violations of the BSA. Ken also did not know that he was reported 
to the government until the day government agents stormed his 
store, prevented customers from entering, searched the area with a 
dog, and interrogated him.15 According to Ken, the government 
agents coerced him to sign a civil forfeiture form, and the 
government agents then seized all of his cash.16 The government 
never charged Ken with a crime.17 
 
C. The Bank Secrecy Act Created This Reality 
 
The intersection of these two stories begs the question: Does 
the Fourth Amendment protect United States citizens’ banking 
information against warrantless searches and seizures by the 
government? “No,” declared Congress by enacting the BSA and the 
Supreme Court in holding that the BSA is constitutional. 
According to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the purpose of the BSA is to combat money laundering, terrorism, 
and other criminal activities.18 Undoubtedly, this aim is legitimate. 
However, in the pursuit of protecting its citizens under the Bank 
Secrecy Act, Congress gave law enforcement the power to search 
citizens’ private bank records without obtaining a warrant. After the 
BSA’s enactment, the Supreme Court upheld these warrantless 
searches as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court came to that holding in United States v. Miller, 
where it applied the “third-party doctrine.”19 Broadly, this doctrine 
holds that information voluntarily disclosed to a third party is not 
subject to Fourth Amendment protections.20 Applying the third-
party doctrine, the Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment does 
not demand an authorized search warrant before the government can 
search an individual’s bank records because there is no 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in such records. By 
voluntarily providing their financial information to a bank, 







18 Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/bsa/index-
bsa.html [https://perma.cc/VMQ5-V2K3].  
19 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
20 Id. at 443.  
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accepting the risk that the bank may not keep their information 
confidential.  
The Court was wrong. It inappropriately applied the third-
party doctrine in its original form—as an outgrowth of a previously 
overruled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This form of the third-
party doctrine excludes all voluntarily disclosed information from 
Fourth Amendment protections. Instead, the Supreme Court should 
have examined the third-party doctrine though the lens of the Katz 
test. The Katz test provides Fourth Amendment protection where 
society would consider it reasonable.21 This test is more flexible and 
would have allowed the Court to strike down the BSA as 
unconstitutional.   
The Supreme Court’s mistake in Miller should render that 
opinion with little precedential value and invite the Court to re-
examine the constitutionality of the BSA. Applying the Katz test to 
modern financial practices strongly suggests that the BSA is 
anathema to the Fourth Amendment because modern living requires 
the use of a bank account for active participation in society. Thus, 
the assertion that an individual’s choice to have a bank account is 
wholly voluntary can hardly be argued. Further, the emergence of 
cryptocurrencies provides evidence that society expects financial 
privacy, as financial privacy and autonomy are core values in 
cryptocurrency theory. For these reasons, the Court should rule that 
the BSA’s allowance of warrantless disclosure of financial 
information to the government violates the Fourth Amendment 
protection against warrantless searches and seizures. 
This article proceeds in analyzing the constitutionality of the 
BSA as to banks in light of the emergence of cryptocurrencies. For 
this analysis, this article will specifically apply the Katz test to the 
banking industry. However, as stated in Part II.B.1, the BSA’s 
mandatory reporting provisions apply to a wide range of businesses, 
consequently providing a broad impact on citizens’ privacy 
expectations against their government far beyond banks. The 
broader societal impact of the BSA thus deserves attention, but it is 
beyond the scope of the present article.  
Within the stated scope, this article proceeds as follows: 
Section II details the creation of the BSA and explains its reporting 
requirements as specific to banks. This section intends to show that 
the BSA is a strict criminal statute that leaves banks with no choice 
but to over-report their customers’ transactions to the government. 
Section III transitions to Fourth Amendment principles. Arguing 
that the Supreme Court in Miller misconceptualized the third-party 
doctrine Section III begins with a careful look at the line of cases 
developing the third-party doctrine. It then shows how the Court 
failed to recognize that the later emergence of the Katz test undercut 
 
21 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 




the reasoning of the third-party doctrine. Section III concludes by 
describing and critiquing the Miller opinion itself. Section IV looks 
at the BSA in the context of the modern era. It argues that society 
would now recognize as reasonable an individual’s privacy 
expectation in banking information—an indicator of constitutional 
protection under the Katz test. Arguing that the BSA violates the 
Fourth Amendment, the final section looks to bank accounts as 
involuntary realities of society and cryptocurrencies as a refute to 
the BSA’s constitutionality. 
 
II. THE BANK SECRECY ACT:  
HISTORY, FORM, & FUNCTION 
 
Congress enacted the BSA “in 1970 following extensive 
hearings concerning the unavailability of foreign and domestic bank 
records of customers thought to be engaged in activities entailing 
criminal or civil liability.”22 Congress intended the BSA to address 
two major areas related to law enforcement-assisted banking: (1) 
financial recordkeeping by domestic banks and (2) United States 
citizens’ use of foreign banks to hide their money.23 
Specific to laws and regulations aimed at domestic banks, 
the BSA enabled a wholesale financial surveillance regime. Because 
banks must report all transactions above $5,000 and any transaction 
that looks “suspicious” to the government, “banks are paying 
attention to even the smallest of . . . transactions.”24 Indeed, “anti-
money laundering” software allows banks to automatically monitor 
approximately 50 million financial transactions per day looking for 
suspicious or unordinary activity.25 While Congress’s intent in 
passing the BSA may have been altruistic, the specific provisions of 
the BSA fail to follow a core constitutional principle: If criminal 
activity “is to be fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of 
individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having 








22 California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26 (1974).  
23 H.R. Rep. 91-975 (1970).  
24 John Borland, The Technology That Toppled Eliot Spitzer, MIT TECHNOLOGY 
REVIEW (Mar. 19, 2008), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/409766/the- 
technology-that-toppled-eliot-spitzer/ [https://perma.cc/26XP-JCMS]. 
25 Id.  
26 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).  
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A. Historical Development 
 
The origins of the BSA are unique, beginning with 
Switzerland’s defiance against Adolf Hitler.27 During World War II, 
Hitler sought to seize assets that German Jews deposited into Swiss 
bank accounts for safekeeping.28 To prevent Hitler’s plundering of 
those assets and for the protection of “legitimate business secrets,” 
Switzerland passed a series of statutes criminalizing the release of 
depositors’ identities.29  
While the Swiss banking system attempted to overcome 
Hitler’s evil intentions, it quickly became a place where Nazi leaders 
themselves would deposit valuables stolen during their conquests.30 
Subsequently in the 1960s, the United States became deeply 
concerned that its citizens were using the same system for illegal 
purposes.31 As the “jet age” facilitated increased travel, the Swiss 
banking system became available to more people.32 Some of these 
individuals took advantage of Swiss banks’ strict secrecy laws to 
avoid culpability for several crimes, from illegal securities 
participation to organized crime’s laundering of money “skimmed” 
from Las Vegas casinos.33  
In 1968, Congress began looking into these issues in 
earnest.34 Congress invited numerous government agencies to speak 
at hearings documenting the relationship between crime and secrecy 
havens. Multiple law enforcement agencies testified to Congress 
that the United States lacked the necessary legal framework to 
identify and prosecute individuals involved in financial crimes 
linked to secret bank accounts.35 The combination of time-
consuming foreign legal processes and secrecy laws often prevented 
law enforcement from obtaining admissible evidence of financial 
crimes.36 Domestically, the government estimated that the use of 
secret bank accounts cost the government loss of tax revenues in the 
 
27 Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign Banking Procedures on the United 
States: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 
2nd Sess. 6 (1968), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b654959; 
view=1up;seq=9;size=150 [https://perma.cc/4RX3-K5YK]  
[hereinafter Legal and Economic Impact]. 
28 Id.; see also James E. Eldridge, The Bank Secrecy Act; Privacy, Comity, and 
the Politics of Contraband, 11 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 667, 668 (1986).  
29 Legal and Economic Impact, supra note 27. 
30 Swiss banks and Nazi gold, THE ECONOMIST (July 2, 1998), 
 http://www.economist.com/node/139987 [https://perma.cc/LMR4-565C]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 9-10. 
33 Id. 
34 James E. Eldridge, The Bank Secrecy Act; Privacy, Comity, and the Politics of 
Contraband, 11 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 667, 669 (1986). 
35 Id. at 669-72. 
36 California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 29 (1974). 




hundreds of millions of dollars.37 A former U.S. Attorney described 
the use of secret bank accounts “as the largest single tax loophole 
permitted by American law.”38 
As Congress intended to close criminals’ use of foreign bank 
accounts, it also believed that it needed to increase law 
enforcement’s access to domestic bank accounts to investigate 
criminal activity. As the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) puts it, 
Congress passed the BSA “in response to increasing reports of 
people bringing bags full of currency of doubtful origin” for deposit 
into banks.”39 In response to these problems, Congress enacted the 
BSA.40 
Yet, Congress did not pass the BSA in a vacuum; it came in 
the greater context of President Richard Nixon’s war on drugs.41 In 
1970, President Nixon signed a suite of additional laws designed to 
provide law enforcement with multiple avenues of criminal 
prosecution of drug crimes,42 including the Controlled Substances 
Act (CSA), the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA), and the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).43 The 
CSA criminalized actions such as drug manufacturing and 
distribution.44 Nevertheless, when a law enforcement agency fails to 
gather sufficient evidence for prosecution under the CSA, that 
agency may still have sufficient evidence to prosecute under OCCA, 
RICO, or the BSA. Both OCCA and RICO target criminal activity, 
while the BSA criminalized entry of ill-gotten money into the 
banking system.45 
Therefore, the BSA emerged as a tool to combat criminal 
activity. The specific provisions of the BSA cast a wide net to 
achieve its goals. In its original form, the Supreme Court recognized 
that there was “no denying the impressive sweep of the authority 





37 Id. at 28.  
38 Id. at 29. 
39 4.26.5 Bank Secrecy Act History and Law, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUALS (2012), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-
026-005#idm139674414931904 [https://perma.cc/R7HH-8QB4]. 
40 Eldridge, supra note 34. 
41 Steven Wisotsky, Exposing The War On Cocaine: The Futility And 
Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1983).   
42 Id. at 1353-54. 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 802(6), 812(c).  
45 Patrick A. Tighe, Underbanked: Cooperative Banking as a Potential Solution 
To The Marijuana-Banking Problem, 114 MICH. L. REV. 803, 808-10 (2016).  
46 California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). 





The current version of the BSA is codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 
5311-5332. Throughout its existence, Congress has expanded the 
scope of the BSA. As currently enacted, the purpose of the BSA is 
“to require certain reports or records where they have a high degree 
of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or 
proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence 
activities, including analysis, to protect against international 
terrorism.”47 The law enforcement arm of the BSA says that the act  
 
requires U.S. financial institutions to assist U.S. 
government agencies to detect and prevent money 
laundering. Specifically, the act requires financial 
institutions to keep records of cash purchases of 
negotiable instruments, file reports of cash 
transactions exceeding $10,000 (daily aggregate 
amount), and to report suspicious activity that might 
signify money laundering, tax evasion, or other 
criminal activities.48 
 
To avoid these penalties, a broad range of institutions must be 
prepared to follow precise rules. 
In general, “financial institutions” must maintain a variety of 
records, including their customers’ identities, copies of certain 
checks, and reports on certain domestic and foreign currency 
transactions, all as proscribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.49 
Additionally, the BSA considers a broad array of businesses as 
“financial institutions.” Organizations designated as “financial 
institutions” include banks, private bankers, credit unions, brokers 
or dealers in securities or commodities, currency exchanges, 
operators of credit card systems, insurance companies, 
pawnbrokers, loan and finance companies, travel agencies, car 
dealerships, certain casinos, and more.50 To accomplish the BSA’s 
domestic law enforcement goals, these financial institutions must 
follow detailed requirements under the threat of severe punishment 
for noncompliance.     
 
 
47 31 U.S.C. § 5311. The Secretary of the Treasury has also determined that the 
reports required under the BSA “have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, 
[and] regulatory investigations or proceedings.” 31 C.F.R. § 1010.301.  
48 FinCEN's Mandate from Congress, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/fincens-mandate-congress 
[https://perma.cc/VBW7-2X54]. 
49 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313(a), 5314(a); California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 
21, 30 (1974). 
50 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (2004).  




1. Domestic Bank Reporting Requirements  
 
Banks carry a particularly heavy regulatory burden under the 
BSA. To begin, they must file a report for every deposit, withdraw, 
exchange, payment, transfer, or other type of transaction involving 
more than $10,000.51 These reports must “verify and record the 
name and address of the individual presenting a transaction, as well 
as record the identity, account number, and the social security or 
taxpayer-identification number, if any, of any person or entity on 
whose behalf such transaction is to be effected.”52 
Moreover, the BSA limits distributing specific monetary 
instruments in amounts of over $3,000,53 whereby banks may not 
“issue or sell a bank check, cashier's check, traveler's check, or 
money order to any individual in connection with a transaction or 
group of such contemporaneous transactions involving United 
States coins or currency (or such other monetary instruments as the 
Secretary may prescribe) in amounts or denominations of $3,000 or 
more . . . .”54 The only exceptions to this rule require banks to verify 
the identity of the purchaser and keep records of the transaction, 
which they must provide to the federal government upon request of 
the Secretary of the Treasury.55 
Whenever any of these conditions are met, banks must send 
their reports directly to the Secretary of the Treasury.56 While these 
provisions of the BSA may seem mechanical in their nature of action 
and response, the BSA also requires banks to actively monitor for 
suspicious activity—a much vaguer and, ultimately, far-reaching 
mandate.  
 
2. Suspicious Activity Reporting Requirements 
 
In addition to the bright-line reporting requirements 
mentioned above, banks must also submit Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs) under certain circumstances.57 The BSA empowers 
the Secretary of the Treasury to decide the parameters of this rule, 
stating that “The Secretary may require any financial institution, and 
any director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial institution, 
 
51 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311. For purposes of reaching the $10,000 threshold, the 
Secretary of the Treasury aggregates all transactions made during a single 
business day by or on behalf of any person. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.313.  
52 31 C.F.R. § 1010.312 (2011). 
53 31 U.S.C. § 5325 (1988). 
54 31 U.S.C. § 5325(a) (1988). 
55 31 U.S.C. § 5325(a)-(b) (1988). 
56 31 U.S.C. § 5312(c)(1)(C) (2004). 
57 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2014). 
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to report any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation 
of law or regulation.”58 
For banks, the BSA delineates two types of SARs: required 
SARs and voluntary SARs. Required SARs can be broken into two 
categories: illegal-transaction SARs and unexplainable-activity 
SARs. Banks are required to file illegal-transaction SARs anytime 
they know, suspect, or have reason to suspect that a transaction of 
$5,000 or more involves money “derived from illegal activity or are 
intended to hide funds from illegal activities . . . as part of a plan to 
violate or avoid any Federal law or regulation…” or other reporting 
requirement of the BSA.59 For unexplainable-activity SARs, a bank 
must file a report on any transaction that the bank feels “has no 
business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which the 
particular customer would normally be expected to engage, and the 
bank knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after 
examining the available facts, including the background and 
possible purpose of the transaction.”60 
On the other hand, banks have quite a bit of discretion for 
voluntary SARs. For any activity that does not require reporting, a 
bank may still file a SAR on a transaction if “it believes [the 
information would be] relevant to the possible violation of any” 
federal mandate.61  
For both types of SARs, the reporting bank must file the 
SAR with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) no 
later than thirty calendar days after discovering the facts that 
constitute the basis of the SAR and must make the supporting 
documentation available for inspection at the federal government’s 
request.62 The bank must maintain the supporting documentation for 
five years.63 Moreover, SARs are strictly confidential, and a bank 
many not disclose its existence to the individual to whom the 
transaction pertains.64 
 
3. Incentives to Report 
 
The BSA imposes significant legal consequences on banks 
for noncompliance, and also conversely provides civil immunity on 
compliant banks as well as a potential reward for reporting. To avoid 
violations in the first instance, the BSA requires that banks 
 
58 Id. 
59 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (2011). 
60 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(2)(iii) (2011). 
61 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(a)(1) (2011). 
62 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(b)(3), (d) (2011). 
63 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(b)(1), (d) (2011).  
64 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2) (2014); see also 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320(e) (2011) 
(regulation specific to banks).  




“maintain appropriate procedures to ensure compliance with [the 
BSA] . . . to guard against money laundering.”65 
If a BSA violation does occur, the potential civil fines are 
quite large. For example, a bank that willfully violates a reporting 
requirement of a domestic transaction can be held liable for a civil 
penalty of at least $25,000 and up to $100,000 per violation per 
day.66 If BSA violations are the result of negligence rather than 
willfulness, the Secretary of the Treasury has the discretion to 
impose no more than $500 on the bank. If that negligent action is 
part of a pattern of negligent activity, the maximum fine the 
Secretary of the Treasury can impose is increased to $50,000.67 
In addition to civil liabilities, BSA violations can give rise to 
criminal culpability.68 A single violation of a domestic transaction 
reporting requirement of the BSA by an individual carries a fine of 
up to $250,000, up to five years of imprisonment, or both.69 If that 
individual’s violation is part of additional illegal activity or a pattern 
of illegal activity that involves more than $100,000 in one year, the 
mandatory sanctions are increased to a fine of up to $500,000, up to 
10 years of imprisonment, or both.70  
On the other hand, the BSA does provide a degree of 
compliance immunity and incentives to banks and individuals. First, 
banks may not be held civilly liable by customers for revealing their 
banking information in SARs.71 Second, if an individual employee 
of a bank reports to the government that the bank, or any of its 
employees, is “possibly” in violation of the BSA, the bank is 
prohibited from retaliating against the whistleblowing employee.72 
Finally, any individual that provides original information leading to 
a recovery of a criminal fine, civil penalty, or forfeiture, for a 
violation of the BSA in excess of $50,000 is eligible for an award of 
either 25% of the money collected by the government or $150,000, 
whichever is less.73 
In sum, the BSA requires banks to closely monitor their 
customers, resulting in banks filing of a considerable number of 
SARs over fear of governmental enforcement actions. The banks 
must file these reports to FinCEN, which in turn uses the reports for 
criminal investigations.  
 
 
65 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2) (2014). 
66 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (2004). 
67 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(6)(B) (2004). 
68 31 U.S.C. § 5321(d) (2004) (emphasis added).  
69 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2001). 
70 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b) (2001).  
71 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(3)(A) (2014). 
72 31 U.S.C. § 5328(a) (2001). 
73 31 U.S.C. § 5323(a)-(b) (1984); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.930(a)-(b) (2011). 
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C. FinCEN and BSA Effectiveness  
 
As required under regulation, banks send their SARs to 
FinCEN. Established in 1990, FinCEN operates under the Assistant 
Secretary for Enforcement of the Department of the Treasury.74 The 
stated mission of FinCEN “is to provide a governmentwide, 
multisource intelligence and analytical network in support of the 
detection, investigation, and prosecution of domestic and 
international money laundering and other financial crimes by 
Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies.”75 To 
achieve its mission, FinCEN is tasked with “analyzing and 
disseminating” all the data it collects to federal and state law 
enforcement agencies to “[i]dentify possible criminal targets” and 
to support ongoing criminal financial investigations.76 FinCEN’s 
reports to law enforcement agencies include instances of banks’ 
non-compliance with the BSA.77 
 Statistics from recent years suggest that FinCEN contributes 
to high rates of successful prosecutions under the BSA but 
investigates a relatively low percentage of SARs. According to the 
IRS, from 2009 to 2016, the total number of BSA anti-money 
laundering investigations, indictments, and successful convictions 
has remained relatively constant. For example, in the fiscal year 
2009, FinCEN initiated 624 investigations, which led to 289 
indictments and a conviction rate of 75.5%.78 In 2011, there were 
795 money laundering investigations initiated, resulting in 462 
indictments and a 75.3% conviction rate.79 The most recent data set 
available is from 2016, showing 504 investigations, 399 
indictments, and a conviction rate of 74.8%.80 These statistics 
include “investigations from Suspicious Activity Report 
(SAR) Review Teams, violations of BSA filing requirements, and 
all” other related requirements.”81 
 However, the total number of SARs reported compared to 
the total number of investigations and indictments suggests a 
massive problem of overreporting. In 2009, FinCEN received 
 
74 Organization, Functions, and Authority Delegations, 55 Fed. Reg. 18, 433-03, 
§ 1 (1990).  
75 Id. at § 2. 
76 Id. at § 4(d)(1)-(2). 
77 Id. at § 4(d)(3). 
78 Statistical Data – Money Laundering and Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/statistic 
al-data-money-laundering-bank-secrecy-act-bsa [https://perma.cc/9P8J-V3TL]. 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 




720,309 SARs from depository institutions alone.82 That number 
increased to 798,688 SARs in 201183 and 958,537 in 2016.84 
 One cannot deny that society benefits from the Federal 
Government’s pursuit of eliminating money-laundering, especially 
in the context of drugs, organized crime, and terrorism. However, 
the expansiveness of the BSA’s directives and resulting 
investigations raises significant Fourth Amendment issues. Justice 
William Brandeis stated:  
 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard 
to protect liberty when the government's purposes are 
beneficent. [Individuals] born to freedom are 
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by 
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by [individuals] of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.85 
 
Yet, the Supreme Court failed to evaluate the BSA under the 
proper Fourth Amendment standards. Thus, the Supreme 
Court allowed Congress to encroach upon its citizens’ 
constitutional rights.  
 
III. THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND  
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that the 
BSA’s requirement that banks report suspicious customer activity 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.86 In its conclusion, the Supreme 
Court relied on the third-party doctrine, stating that individuals do 
not retain privacy interests in information shared with banks.87 
Based on the underlying policy of the third-party doctrine and then-
recent developments in Fourth Amendment conceptions, the 
Supreme Court erred in its ruling. 
 More precisely, the Supreme Court developed the third-
party doctrine in an era when Fourth Amendment protections were 
 
82 FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE SAR ACTIVITY REVIEW – 
BY THE NUMBERS, FINCEN.GOV, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/ 
sar_report/sar_by_numb_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/GCH5-RRT6]. 
83 Id. 
84 FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, SAR STATS – ISSUE 3 – 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, SAR STATS TECHNICAL BULLETIN, FINCEN.GOV 
(Mar. 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/sar_report/2017-03- 
09/SAR%20Stats%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AUK-LL2L]. 
85 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
86 See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
87 Id. 
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based on trespass principles.88 However, shortly before Miller, the 
Supreme Court held that Fourth Amendment rights protected 
“people, not places.”89 Thus displacing the traditional trespass-
based analysis, the Supreme Court looked, in part, at whether 
society would consider a particular search reasonable in the absence 
of a warrant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not analyze 
Miller in this new fashion and instead reverted to the traditional 
trespass-based analysis of the Fourth Amendment under the guise of 
the third-party doctrine.90  
 
A. Fourth Amendment Protection Against Unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures 
 
The United States Constitution does not have a general 
provision protecting privacy.  Instead, it grants only a few, specific 
privacy rights. For example, the Fourth Amendment prevents the 
government from unreasonably peering into the lives of its citizens: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.91 
 
Fourth Amendment protections are currently analyzed under the 
Katz test.92 Broadly, the Katz test states that a court must analyze 
and determine whether the actions taken by the government are 
considered a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.93 If the 
court does not find a reasonable “objective” privacy interest 
implicated by the government’s action, the Fourth Amendment is 
not implicated.94 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated 
if the court cannot find that the defendant had a “subject” privacy 
interest invaded by the government’s action.95   
Then, if the Fourth Amendment applies, the court will 
determine whether the search or seizure was “reasonable.”96 If the 
search was for law enforcement purposes, “reasonableness” 
 
88 See infra Part III.A.1. 
89 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
90 See Miller, 425 U.S. 435. 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
92 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
93 See id.   
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014).  




generally requires the government to have first obtained a warrant 
authorized by a neutral magistrate that is supported by probable 
cause.97 In the absence of a warrant, the search is only reasonable 
if it “falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement” 
and is supported by probable cause.98 
However, the Katz test is relatively new. Until the 1960s, the 
court used a “trespass” test: if the government was not physically 
trespassing in a private space, it was not violating the Fourth 
Amendment.99 The third-party doctrine developed from this view 
of the Fourth Amendment, and its strict application became a 
powerful tool for law enforcement. With the emergence of the Katz 
test, on the other hand, the justifications supporting the strict 
application of the third-party doctrine have been severely 
diminished.    
Two years after it adopted the Katz test, the Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to apply it to the BSA in United States v. 
Miller.100 But, instead of providing a robust analysis of the BSA 
under the Katz test, the Supreme Court defaulted to the 
anachronistic conceptions of the third-party doctrine.101 
Specifically, the Court in Miller mistakenly relied on the line of 
cases which created the third-party doctrine without recognizing 
how Katz undercut its reasoning in those cases.102  
This and other missteps in analysis provides grounds for the 
Supreme Court to revisit the question of the BSA’s 
constitutionality. The following sections explain (1) the evolution 
of the third-party doctrine, the Katz test, and how the Supreme 
Court initially tried to reconcile the two; (2) the Miller case; and 
(3) why the Court’s decision in Miller was wrong.   
 
1. Historical Development of the Third-Party Doctrine 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not apply where the third-party 
doctrine does.103 The third-party doctrine states that “a person has 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily 
 
97 See, e.g., Id. at 382. 
98 See, e.g., Id. 
99 See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). 
100 See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
101 See infra Part III.B.   
102 Id. 
103 E.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). For ease of reading, I 
use the common description of the doctrine as being an “exception” to the Fourth 
Amendment. However, the use of “exception” is imprecise—it assumes that the 
Fourth Amendment initially applies to a particular situation and then the third-
party doctrine functions as a reprieve. In fact, the third-party doctrine is the initial 
consideration; if it applies to a particular situation, then that situation is outside 
the realm of Fourth Amendment law.   
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turns over to third parties.”104 Over time, the Supreme Court 
expanded the third-party doctrine into a binary inquiry “in which 
any information disclosed to a third party for any reason is public 
and does not merit Fourth Amendment protection.”105 The third-
party doctrine was the result of the Court’s trespass-based 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, a detailed 
analysis of the line of cases establishing the third-party doctrine is 
necessary in order to evaluate the third-party doctrine under the later 
Katz test. The result of the analysis of the third-party doctrine’s 
lineage shows that an “all or nothing” approach to the third-party 
doctrine is inextricably attached to the trespass doctrine. Thus, the 
Katz test demands a retooling of the third-party doctrine.  
The Supreme Court first recognized the third-party doctrine 
in Gouled v. United States.106 In Gouled, the United States Army 
suspected that the defendant was part of a conspiracy to defraud the 
government through contracts for clothing and equipment, so it sent 
an undercover private to obtain information from the defendant.107 
The private, a former business acquaintance of the defendant, 
travelled to the defendant’s office for a “friendly” visit.108 The 
defendant allowed the private to enter his office; when the defendant 
momentarily stepped out, the private took and carried away several 
documents from the defendant.109 The private did not have a 
warrant.110 The government used the seized documents as evidence 
at trial, which ultimately resulted in the defendant’s conviction.111 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the private’s 
warrantless seizure of his documents violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights, and that the court should have suppressed that 
evidence at trial.112 The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, 
finding that it was significant that the private took the papers outside 
the presence of the defendant.113 The Court reasoned that a secret 
taking of an object, despite being voluntarily invited into office, is 
analogous to a forced or coerced entry and seizure prohibited by the 





105 Note, If These Walls Could Talk, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1931 (2017). 
106 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).  




111 Id. at 303. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 306. 
114 Id. at 305-06. 




[w]hether entrance to the home or office of a person 
suspected of crime be obtained by a representative . 
. .  of the government . . . and whether the owner be 
present or not when he enters, any search and seizure 
subsequently and secretly made in his absence, falls 
within the scope of the prohibition of the Fourth 
Amendment . . . . 115  
 
This ruling, while favorable for the defendant, implicitly endorsed 
governmental subterfuge. The Court’s endorsement came from the 
Court’s pure reliance on the voluntariness of the defendant’s 
actions.116 In this case, the idea of voluntariness only manifested 
when the private took the papers outside of the defendant’s presence 
because the defendant was not present to give consent, and the Court 
assumed that he would not have if he were.117 The fact that the 
private gained the defendant’s permission to enter the office under 
false pretenses was of no regard—that still counted as voluntary 
consent.118  
Seven years later, in Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme 
Court emphasized voluntariness and trespass as a part of Fourth 
Amendment considerations.119 In Olmstead, the government 
suspected that the defendant was involved in a “conspiracy of 
amazing magnitude”120 to violate the National Prohibition Act.121 
The government wiretapped the defendant’s home and office 
telephones without a warrant to conduct its investigation.122 The 
government accomplished this by attaching wires to the telephone 
lines across the street from his home and in the basement below the 
defendant’s office.123 The government was thus able to listen to the 
defendant’s conversations without any act of trespass.124 Therefore, 
 
115 Id. at 306 (emphasis added). 
116 See id.   
117 See id. at 305-06.   
118 See id. at 306.  
119 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-66 (1928).  
120 “The evidence in the records discloses a conspiracy of amazing magnitude to 
import, possess, and sell liquor unlawfully. It involved the employment of not less 
than 50 persons, of two sea-going vessels for the transportation of liquor to British 
Columbia, of smaller vessels for coastwise transportation to the state of 
Washington, the purchase and use of a branch beyond the suburban limits of 
Seattle, with a large underground cache for storage and a number of smaller 
caches in that city, the maintenance of a central office manned with operators, and 
the employment of executives, salesmen, deliverymen dispatchers, scouts, 
bookkeepers, collectors, and an attorney. In a bad month sales amounted to 
$176,000; the aggregate for a year must have exceeded $2,000,000.” Id. at 455-
56. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 456-57. 
124 Id. at 457. 
 Seattle J. Tech., Envtl. & Innovation Law               [Vol. 10:1 
 
152 
the government used evidence gained from the wiretaps in the 
defendant’s trial which lead to his conviction.125 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the government’s 
warrantless interception of his private conversations violated the 
Fourth Amendment.126 The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the government 
did not trespass upon his property or seize any physical objects.127 
In addition to a lack of physical trespass or seizure, the Court 
regarded the voluntariness of the defendant’s conversations as an 
essential consideration: “Here we have testimony only of voluntary 
conversations secretly overheard.”128 The Court viewed that a “well-
known historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment” is to prevent 
the government from compelling suspects to agree to searches or 
seizures against their will.129 Without government coercion, the 
defendant’s conversations were voluntary.130 
Therefore, the Court built upon Gouled by allowing for more 
than knowing and voluntary disclosure, but also for a defendant’s 
complete unawareness of the eavesdropping of another party. 
Unlike the Court in Gouled, the Court in Olmstead did not assume 
what the defendant would have done had he known the government 
was listening to his conversations.131 This distinction highlights the 
connection of voluntariness to a physical location or tangible object. 
Without trespass, the Court assumed voluntariness.132  
The Supreme Court further expanded this “voluntariness” 
reasoning in the 1960s as it decided a series of Fourth Amendment 
cases which evaluated defendants’ statements to undercover 
government agents.133 For example, in Lopez, the defendant was 
convicted for attempted bribery of an Internal Revenue Service 
agent.134 The agent was initially investigating whether the defendant 
was evading taxes in the operation of his hotel.135 At the defendant’s 
hotel, the agent asked the defendant if the hotel provided 
entertainment in the evenings, such as singing or dancing.136 The 
defendant stated the hotel did not.137 But when the agent returned 
later that same evening and again the next day, the agent discovered 
 
125 Id. at 455, 457. 
126 Id. at 455. 
127 Id. at 466. 
128 Id. at 464. 
129 Id. at 463. 
130 Id. at 463-69. 
131 See id.  
132 See id. at 463. 
133 See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Hoffa v. United States, 
385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). 
134 Lopez, 373 U.S. at 428. 
135 Id. at 429. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 




that the hotel was indeed hosting dancing.138 The agent again 
confronted the defendant, stating that he believed that the defendant 
might be liable for a cabaret tax and requested to inspect the 
defendant’s books.139 The defendant took the agent back to his 
office and offered the agent $420 to “drop this case.”140 
After the bribe, the agent took the money and reported the 
event to his supervisor.141 The IRS equipped the agent with a secret 
recording device and sent the agent back to the hotel to get the 
defendant to discuss the previous bribery event.142 The plan worked; 
the agent returned to the hotel and recorded a conversation with the 
defendant in which the defendant recognized the previous bribe and 
set up a system for continuing payments in order to avoid taxes.143 
The court admitted the recording as evidence and allowed 
the agent to testify in the trial despite the defendant’s objections 
under the Fourth Amendment, which led to the defendant’s 
conviction.144 The defendant appealed, and the issue reached the 
Supreme Court.145 The Supreme Court decided that admission of the 
recording at trial did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.146 Similar to the Court in Olmstead, the Supreme Court 
employed the trespass doctrine for its analysis.147 The court held that 
the agent did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
because the defendant invited the agent into his office and because 
the agent did not furtively seize any evidence.148 The Supreme Court 
specifically harkened back to Gouled and emphaisized that the 
linchpin of its holding was trespass, not the nature of the defendant’s 
statement.149 Therefore, the recording and the fact that the defendant 
likely would not have made any incriminating statements had he 
known of the recording were immaterial in the Supreme Court’s 
decision.150  
The Supreme Court subsequently expanded the Lopez 
principles simultaneously in Hoffa v. United States and United 
States v. Lewis by disregarding whether the defendant knew the true 
identity of the listener.151 Put another way, the third-party doctrine 




140 Id. at 430. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 431-32. 
144 Id. at 432-33. 
145 Id. at 427. 
146 Id. at 439. 
147 Id. at 438-39. 
148 Id. at 430. 
149 Id. at 438. 
150 Id.  
151 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
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defendant. The facts in Hoffa begin with the defendant on trial for 
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.152 During the trial, the defendant 
stayed in a hotel suite and was frequently visited by two 
associates.153 The defendant had voluntary conversations with the 
associates in multiple locations around the site of the trial.154 During 
the conversations, the defendant discussed his efforts to bribe the 
jurors in his trial.155 However, unbeknownst to the defendant, one of 
the associates was reporting the contents of their conversations to a 
federal agent.156 In fact, the reporting associate was acting as a 
government agent.157 
 With this information, the government indicted the 
defendant for attempting to bribe jurors.158 The court admitted that 
the reporting associate’s disclosures and testimony at the 
defendant’s trial “unquestionably contribut[ed]” to the defendant’s 
conviction.159 The defendant appealed his conviction and argued 
that the court violated the Fourth Amendment when it admitted the 
evidence derived from the reporting associate in his trial.160 More 
specifically, the defendant called upon the Supreme Court to 
determine whether the reporting associate’s “failure to disclose his 
role as a government informer vitiated the consent that [the 
defendant] gave to [the reporting associate’s] repeated entries into 
the suite, and that by listening to [his] statements [the reporting 
associate] conducted an illegal ‘search’ for verbal evidence.”161 The 
Supreme Court found the defendant’s argument that his voluntary 
statements to and around the associate unconvincing.162 The 
defendant “was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he was 
relying on his misplaced confidence that [the reporting associate] 
would not reveal his wrongdoing.”163 Citing Lopez, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that the Fourth Amendment does not “protect[] a 
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily 
 
152 Id. at 294. 




157 Id. at 298-99. The parties in this case disagreed on the incentives of the 
reporting associate, as he was himself facing separate criminal charges before 
being approached by the government to be an informer. Id. The Supreme Court 
rendered its opinion on the assumption that the reporting associate as a 
government agent—acting in the interests of the government—for the entire 
course of events. Id.  
158 Id. at 294-95. 
159 Id. at 296-97. 
160 Id. at 300. 
161 Id. at 300-01 (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)).  
162 Id. at 301-03. 
163 Id. at 302. 




confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”164 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court went as far as to quote the Lopez opinion’s reasoning, which 
cited Gouled, to highlight that the associate did not seize anything 
not freely given to him: “He was in the office with [the defendant’s] 
consent, and while there [the reporting associate] did not violate the 
privacy of the office by seizing something surreptitiously without 
petitioner’s knowledge.”165  
The Supreme Court released its opinion in Lewis v. United 
States the same day as  Hoffa, emphasizing its holding that 
government subterfuge does not make a statement involuntary.166 In 
Lewis, the defendant invited an undercover law enforcement officer 
into his home and sold the agent unlawful narcotics.167 The trial 
court convicted the defendant because he violated various narcotics 
laws in a trial where his interactions with the undercover officer 
were admitted into evidence over his objection.168 On appeal, the 
defendant argued that the admission of such evidence violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights because he could not have waived his 
privacy protections inside his home when he invited the officer 
inside because “the invitation was induced by fraud and 
deception.”169 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed.170 The Supreme 
Court noted that the “pretense resulted in no breach of privacy” and 
focused on the defendant’s voluntary statements and the defendant 
freely invited the officer into his home.171 Further the Supreme 
Court noted that pretense “merely encouraged the [defendant] to say 
things which he was willing and anxious to say to anyone who 
would be interested in purchasing [narcotics].”172 
This line of cases shows that up until 1966, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment as only protecting 
unreasonable physical trespass and seizures. The third-party 
doctrine emerged under this interpretation. On these terms, 
voluntariness was a defendant-centric inquiry. The Court did not 
evaluate whether the defendant knew he was speaking to a 
government agent or whether one was secretly listening. Then, the 
Katz test was created and undercut the line of cases behind the third-




164 Id. (citing Lopez v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). 
165 Id. at 303. 
166 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).  
167 Id. at 206-07. 
168 Id. at 208.  
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 212. 
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
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2. Emergence of the Katz Test 
 
The Supreme Court recognized a different Fourth 
Amendment paradigm in Katz v. United States when it held that the 
Fourth Amendment protects people but does not protect places.173 
Under this new standard, Justice Harlan articulated the test that 
would henceforth guide Fourth Amendment inquiry.174 As this case 
displaced the trespass doctrine, the Supreme Court also redefined 
the third-party doctrine as it was then understood.  
In Katz, the defendant was convicted in federal court for 
various crimes after he “transmit[ted] wagering information by 
telephone” across state lines.175 The trial court allowed the 
government to introduce recordings of the defendant’s end of a 
telephone conversation into evidence despite the defendant’s 
objection, which contributed to the defendant’s conviction.176 The 
government obtained the defendant’s conversation by placing “an 
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public 
telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.”177  
Following conviction, the defendant appealed, contending 
that the government’s listening and recording of his phonebooth 
conversation violated his Fourth Amendment rights.178 The Court of 
Appeals disagreed; it held that the government did not violate the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because the government did 
not “physical[ly enter] into the area occupied by” the defendant.179  
The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari.180 At the Supreme Court, the defendant argued 
that a public telephone booth was a constitutionally protected area 
and that physical penetration was necessary before the government 
violated the Fourth Amendment.181 In essence, the defendant 
challenged the trespass doctrine.  
Initially, the Supreme Court took exception to the 
defendant’s formulation of the issues.182 The Supreme Court 
rejected both the defendant’s and the government’s strict reliance on 
the physical location of the putative search because such analysis 
was not a “talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment 
problem.”183 Instead, the Supreme Court declared that “[w]hat a 
 
173 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
174 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
175 Id. at 348. 
176 See id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 348-49. 
180 Id. at 349. 
181 Id. at 349-50. 
182 Id. at 350. 
183 Id. at 350-51, 351 n.9. 




person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to 
the public, may be constitutionally protected.”184  
The Supreme Court applied these principles and concluded 
that the defendant’s actions demonstrated that he sought to preserve 
his privacy.185 The government argued that the defendant could not 
have expected any privacy because phone booths are made out of 
glass, but the court couched the defendant’s privacy expectation in 
terms of audio privacy.186 Specifically, the court held that the 
defendant had an expectation that his conversation would be private 
because he shut the phonebooth door behind himself and paid the 
toll to make his call.187 
Then, the Supreme Court then considered whether Fourth 
Amendment searches require the government’s physical presence 
during a search.188 Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized that its 
previous jurisprudence limited Fourth Amendment application to 
instances of the government’s physical trespass and seizure of 
material items, specifically citing Olmstead and Goldman.189 
However, the Court also recognized that such an approach had 
“been discredited.”190 The Supreme Court accomplished this by 
citing Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, which recognized that 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has decoupled from the common-
law understanding of property to the broader concept of personal 
privacy.191 As such, the Supreme Court announced that the so-called 
“trespass doctrine” was no longer valid.192 
Thus, the Supreme Court disregarded the absence of the 
government’s physical presence in the phonebooth and concluded 
that the government violated the defendant’s justified expectation of 
privacy while using the phonebooth.193 Therefore, the government’s 
electronic eavesdropping on the defendant constituted a “search and 
seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because of 
the defendant’s reasonable privacy expectation.194 In finding that the 
government’s actions constituted a “search and seizure” under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court ultimately held that 
 
184 Id. at 351 (citations omitted). 




189 Id. at 352-53 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 466 (1928); 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942)). 
190 Id. at 353. 
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eavesdropping on the defendant was unreasonable because the 
government failed to get a warrant and no exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement existed.195 
Beyond the facts of the case, Katz became significant for 
Justice Harlan’s test to judge whether a government action 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search and seizure.”196 Precisely, 
Justice Harlan stated that his “understanding of the rule that has 
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”197 Henceforth, Justice 
Harlan’s “Katz test” became the controlling interpretation of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.198  
Looking at the reasoning of Katz, the principles underlying 
the third-party doctrine were necessarily shaken. First, the Court 
expressly renounced the trespass doctrine. The  government could 
now be found to have violated the Fourth Amendment without any 
physical trespass or seizure. Secondly, the Court’s reasoning 
overruled any case stating that the government could eavesdrop on 
a defendant through wiretaps and without the use of a confederate, 
such as in Olmstead. Furthermore, in the bigger picture, the third-
party doctrine could no longer be viewed as a binary, all or nothing 
analysis because the Katz test requires an evaluation of what the 
defendant and society would deem to be reasonably private, 
regardless of how the defendant made the statement. Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court struggled to fully apply the Katz test in the cases 
preceding Miller, falling back upon old conceptions of the Fourth 
Amendment instead.  
 
3. Early Tension Between The Katz Test And The Third-
Party Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court struggled to harmonize Katz with the 
third-party doctrine in subsequent cases.199 In United States v. 
White, the Court failed to analyze the third-party doctrine under the 
Katz test; rather, it reapplied the third-party doctrine as 
conceptualized under the trespass doctrine.200 In White, the 
government was investigating a defendant for illegal drug 
transactions.201 To gather incriminating evidence on the defendant, 
 
195 See id. at 354-59. 
196 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
197 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
198 See, e.g., U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
745, 749 (1971). 
199 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
200 See id. 
201 Id. at 746. 




the government used an informant who had several conversations 
with the defendant regarding illegal drug transactions.202 The 
locations of these conversations included a restaurant, a car, the 
informant’s home, and the defendant’s home.203 During all of these 
conversations, the informant was secretly wearing a radio 
transmitter that allowed government agents to listen to the 
conversations through radio equipment in real-time.204 The 
conversations that took place at the informant’s home were also 
listened to by an agent concealed in a closed kitchen (with the 
informant’s consent).205 
When it came time for trial, the government could not locate 
and produce the informant as a witness.206 Instead, the government 
introduced the testimony of the agents who had listened to the 
defendant’s conversations via the radio transmitter.207 The 
defendant objected to the agents’ testimonies which the court 
overruled.208 At the end of the trial, the jury found the defendant 
guilty.209 
The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the 
agents’ testimonies violated his Fourth Amendment rights.210 The 
Court of Appeals ruled that the agents’ statements were inadmissible 
under the principles outlined in Katz.211 The court stated that there 
was no substantive legal difference between the bug used in Katz 
and an informant wearing a wire.212 However, the Court of Appeals 
reasoned by analogy to Katz rather than employing the Katz test.213 
In doing so, the court held that Katz stands for the per se rule that all 
covert, warrantless eavesdropping by the government violates the 
Fourth Amendment.214 Additionally, the court concluded that the 
listener’s consent was “irrelevant.”215 The court emphasized that the 
Fourth Amendment required such a rule for efficacy:  
 
That amendment's search and seizure protection is 
lost to a person when his actions as a matter of law 
can be said to constitute a waiver of his right. Since 
the Fourth Amendment protects a speaker's right to 
 
202 Id. at 746-47. 
203 Id. at 747. 
204 Id. at 746-47. 
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privacy, this right would be illusory if it could be 
waived by other individuals.216  
 
In this sentence, the Court of Appeals took Katz as obliterating the 
third-party doctrine without using the Katz test in its analysis.217 
The Supreme Court took a position opposite that of the Court 
of Appeals, holding that Katz did not implicate the third-party 
doctrine whatsoever because the defendant could neither show that 
he had any constitutionally protected right to expect, nor prevent 
those to whom he spoketo not later reveal that converstion to the 
police.218  
In analyzing the issue, the Supreme Court considered the 
third-party doctrine and traced it through Hoffa, Lewis, and Lopez, 
and determined that these cases “remained unaffected by Katz 
[sic].”219 The Court took those cases as creating a per se rule that a 
person can never have an expectation of privacy in the information 
disclosed to another;220 though on its surface, it appeared as if the 
Court used the Katz test to reach this decision. However, the Court’s 
opinion was actually driven by the trespass doctrine version of the 
third-party doctrine, which only analyzes  the volition of the 
defendant’s statements in the absence of a physical search or 
seizure.  
This is seen in how the Court viewed the defendant’s thought 
process in sharing information with a third party:  
 
If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the 
association will very probably end or never 
materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, 
or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of 
what his course will be, what he will or will not do 
or say, we are unpersuaded that he would distinguish 
between probably informers on the one hand and 
probable informers with transmitters on the other.221 
 
But, this hypothetical thought process leaves no room for a person 
to share information and retain a privacy expectation in that 
information. The Court in White focused on the defendant’s free will 
whether to share was determinative—the binary choice associated 
 
216 Id. at 845. 
217 Id. at 843-48. 
218 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). 
219 Id. at 749-50. 
220 See id. 
221 Id. at 752. 




with the trespass doctrine, not the Katz test. Upon this reasoning,222 
the Court held that the government did not violate the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights and denied his motion. 223   
 Thus, White laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court to 
adhere to the trespass doctrine version of the third-party doctrine 
despite the Katz decision. To the extent that the Court’s decision was 
result-driven, the Court could have fully performed the Katz test in 
White to find that the defendant had no expectation of privacy. 
Society would unlikely accept a defendant’s expectation of privacy 
in a conversation with a police informant as reasonable in that 
limited context and for the public good. Unfortunately, the Court’s 
flawed reasoning laid the groundwork for future faulty decisions. By 
using the third-party doctrine as valid per se rule, the Court left room 
for the possibility that society could consider a privacy expectation 
in the information given to a third party to be reasonable in 
circumstances substantially different from those in White. Indeed, 
that is what happened when the Court decided the constitutionality 
of the BSA.  
 
B. The Supreme Court Applies the Third-Party Doctrine to 
the Bank Secrecy Act 
 
Finally, in 1976, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
evaluate the BSA in light of the relatively new Katz test. 
Unfortunately, the Court only gave a cursory nod to the Katz test 
and reverted back to the pre-Katz conception of the third-party 
doctrine224 from the case of U.S. v. Miller.225 In Miller, law 
enforcement’s ultimate warrantless search of the defendant’s bank 
records stemmed from when the defendant first came to law 
enforcement’s attention.226 That attention came as a consequence of 
an informant’s tip to law enforcement, which led to a traffic stop of 
two of the defendant’s co-conspirators.227 During the stop, law 
enforcement found illegal distillery equipment and raw materials in 
the vehicle.228 A few weeks later, a warehouse rented to the 
defendant caught on fire, and during the response to the fire, law 
 
222 Actually, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred by applying 
Katz retroactively. White, 401 U.S. at 753-54 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 
U.S. 244 (1969)). This raises interesting precedential issues. Since the Supreme 
Court’s purported Katz reasoning was unnecessary to denying the defendant’s 
motion, it could be regarded as dicta.  
223 White, 401 U.S. at 754. 
224 See U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 437. 
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
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enforcement found “a[n illegal] 7,500-gallon-capacity distillery, 
175 gallons of nontax-paid whiskey, and related paraphernalia.”229 
As law enforcement officials investigated the defendant, 
they issued grand jury subpoenas to the presidents of two separate 
banks where the defendant maintained accounts.230 The particular 
subpoenas used in this case were issued in blank by the clerk of the 
trial court and completed by the United States Attorney’s office.231 
These subpoenas required the bank presidents to appear before the 
grand jury on a specific date and produce “all records of accounts, i. 
e., savings, checking, loan or otherwise, in the name of” the 
defendant from approximately two months prior through the 
present.232 The banks already kept the requested records under the 
requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d).233 The bank presidents 
provided the requested information to law enforcement and were 
therefore excused from appearing before the grand jury.234 
Throughout this process, the banks never notified the defendant 
about the subpoenas.235  
Eventually, the grand jury indicted the defendant for various 
financial crimes and the defendant’s case went to trial.236 At trial, 
the defendant moved to suppress the documents provided by the 
bank presidents, arguing that they were illegally seized because they 
were the product of a non-judicially ordered subpoena.237 The trial 
court denied the defendant’s motion, but the Court of Appeals 
reversed.238 The Court of Appeals held that the defendant had a 
Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the bank records.239 As such, 
the subpoena violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights for 
not being obtained through an “adequate ‘legal process.’”240 The 
government then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.241 
In its decision, the Supreme Court ultimately held that “there 
was no intrusion into any area in which [the defendant] had a 
protected Fourth Amendment interest,” and thus reversed the Court 
of Appeals.242 The Supreme Court began its analysis by affirming 
the Court of Appeals’s holding that “‘no interest legitimately 
protected by the Fourth Amendment’ is implicated by governmental 
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230 Id. at 437-38. 
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232 Id. at 437-38. 
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investigative activities unless there is an intrusion into a zone of 
privacy, into ‘the security a man relies upon when he places himself 
or his property within a constitutionally protected area.’”243 The 
Supreme Court diverged from the Court of Appeals in its belief that 
the bank documents did not “fall within a protected zone of 
privacy.”244 
“On its face,” the Supreme Court said the bank documents 
were not the defendant’s “private papers” because they were the 
business records of the banks.245 Although the records contained 
personally identifiable information of the defendant, the records 
belonged to the banks because the banks created the records 
themselves as a party in the defendant’s banking transactions.246 As 
the Court put it, the banks had a “substantial stake” in dealing with 
negotiable instruments with the defendant.247 
The Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the unique combination of the BSA’s recordkeeping 
requirements and the government’s access to those records through 
a subpoena was “the functional equivalent of a search and seizure” 
of his “private papers,” thus implicating his Fourth Amendment 
rights as if the government sought the bank records” directly from 
his custody.248 The Supreme Court framed this issue as “whether the 
compulsion embodied in the [BSA] as exercised in this case creates 
a Fourth Amendment interest in the depositor where none existed 
before.”249 
Disposing of the defendant’s argument, the court gave a 
passing nod to the Katz test by parroting the rule’s language in the 
context of what the defendant was arguing.250 However, the 
Supreme Court immediately countered that Katz “also stressed that 
‘[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection.”251 The Court further included the 
rule that it is necessary to “examine the nature of the particular 
documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether 
there is a legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their 
contents.”252 
 Under these rules, the Court only looked to the second part 
of the Katz test—whether society would recognize a privacy 
 




247 Id. (citing California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 48-49 (1974)). 
248 Id. at 441. 
249 Id.  
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expectation in bank records as being reasonable.253 The Supreme 
Court answered in the negative by looking to the third-party doctrine 
as well as the pronouncements of Congress. For the third-party 
doctrine, the Court looked primarily to White and its predecessor 
cases, stating, 
 
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed 
by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will 
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence 
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.254 
 
In this, “The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”255 
In regard to Congressional intent, the Court justified a 
societal lack of expectation of privacy in bank records through the 
mere existence of the BSA.256 Explaining Congress’s intent, the 
Court articulated, 
 
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy 
concerning the information kept in bank records was 
assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy 
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require 
records to be maintained because they “have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and regulatory 
investigations and proceedings.”257 
 
Further, neither did the Courtbelieve that the BSA’s record-keeping 
mandate impacted its Fourth Amendment analysis.258 Here, the 
Court first avowed that such requirements do not transform the 
banks into government agents.259 The Court then said that even if it 
were to consider the banks as “acting solely as Government agents,” 
there would still be no Fourth Amendment violation because the 
banks recorded the information and provided it pursuant to the 
subpoena “without protests.”260 
 
253 See id. 
254 Id. at 443. 
255 Id.  
256 See id. at 442-43. 
257 Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 
(1973)). 
258 Id. at 443. 
259 Id. (citing California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52-53 (1974)). 
260 Id. 




 In the end, the Court held that the BSA did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. In its reasoning, the Court relied on the 
trespass-doctrine formulation of the third-party doctrine as well as 
wrongly deferring to congressional opinion. Because of these errors, 
the constitutionality of the BSA must be reevaluated.  
 
C. Criticism of the Supreme Court’s Opinion 
 
In Miller, the Supreme Court’s analysis erred in two 
respects: (1) it did not apply the Katz test to its rightful extent, but 
reverting to outmoded concepts of the third-party doctrine, and (2) 
let Congress define constitutional law. Without these errors, the 
Court would have likely held that the BSA violated the Fourth 
Amendment. At a minimum, these flaws should cause Miller to have 
little precedential value.  
First, the Court failed to reconcile the third-party doctrine 
with the Katz test. As discussed in section III.A.1, the third-party 
doctrine evolved out of the Court’s trespass doctrine. The strict 
policy supporting the trespass doctrine was that if an individual does 
not control a location or relinquishes control of a location by inviting 
the government in, then that individual can expect no Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights. This reasoning has necessarily 
influenced the third-party doctrine—by relinquishing control of a 
piece of information, an individual can no longer expect any control 
over that information.  
It was the trespass doctrine-based understanding of the third-
party doctrine that the Supreme Court applied in Miller. The Court 
first showed its use when it quoted Hoffa to analyze the 
constitutionality of the BSA—that there is no Fourth Amendment 
violation unless the government violates “the security a man relies 
upon when he places himself or his property within a 
constitutionally protected area.”261 This pre-Katz language focuses 
Fourth Amendment protections on locations, the hallmark of the 
trespass doctrine.262 Next, the Court emphasized that the banks had 
possession of the records supplied to the government. Again, this is 
a trespass doctrine-based analysis because it looks solely to the 
physical location and ownership of records.263 This analysis is a 
direct appeal to the traditional third-party doctrine because it asserts 
that the defendant could not have privacy interest in the information 
that he voluntarily gave to the banks.  
 Still, the Supreme Court purported to apply the Katz test, but 
it did so in name only.264 The Court merely restated that the bank 
 
261 Id. at 440. 
262 See supra Part III.A. 
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documents “contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to 
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business,” rather than asking the right Katz question: Does society 
expect privacy in bank records?265 Finally, the Court solidified its 
trespass doctrine-based third-party doctrine analysis by string-citing 
White, Hoffa, and Lopez.266 From these cases, the Court struck the 
final blow to the defendant: 
 
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs 
to another, that the information will be conveyed by 
that person to the Government. . . . This Court has 
held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government 
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the 
assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed.267  
 
Therefore, as seen by the cases it cited and the analyses it utilized, 
the Supreme Court applied the third-party doctrine under the 
trespass-doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.  
If the Court looked at the third-party doctrine though the lens 
of the Katz test, it would have seen that the strictness of the third-
party doctrine has eroded. Under the Katz paradigm, “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.”268 Moreover, while an 
individual may still lose Fourth Amendment protection in 
information purposefully exposed to third parties, “what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”269 By asking if the defendant exhibits a 
subjective privacy interest that society would objectively recognize 
as reasonable (the Katz test), it is evident that there is room for 
privacy in the information disclosed to third-parties. Yet, the 
Supreme Court in Miller did not go into this particular analysis.  
By not recognizing the full extent of the Katz test, the Court 
failed to analyze its specific components. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
only touched upon societal expectations while discussing subpoena 
requirements, not Katz’s substantive analysis.270 Specifically, the 
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Many banks traditionally kept permanent records of 
their depositors' accounts, although not all banks did 
so and the practice was declining in recent years. By 
requiring that such records be kept by all banks, the 
Bank Secrecy Act is not a novel means designed to 
circumvent established Fourth Amendment rights. It 
is merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a proper 
and longstanding law enforcement technique by 
insuring that records are available when they are 
needed.271  
 
However, this statement does not explain why banks were moving 
away from keeping permanent records of their customers. Perhaps 
it was merely for procedural efficiency; perhaps it was because 
customers considered such records a privacy threat. Moreover, the 
Court’s statement only looks back at past practices but not current, 
and potentially different, realities. Regardless, this is not sufficient 
analysis for the Katz test.  
 Second, the Supreme Court erred by interpreting the pure 
existence of the BSA as relevant to its constitutional analysis. 
Allowing statutes to determine constitutional law is anathema to the 
American system. As stated in Marbury v. Madison, “the particular 
phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and 
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void . . . .”272 
This has been a fundamental principle throughout the United States’ 
existence. As the Supreme Court stated much later in 1997, 
“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what 
that right is. It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power 
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”273 Stated 
plainly, Congress does not decide what is constitutional, the 
Supreme Court does.  
 However, that is what the Supreme Court allowed when it 
called to congressional intent to justify a lack of privacy interests in 
bank documents:  
 
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy 
concerning the information kept in bank records was 
assumed by Congress in enacting the Bank Secrecy 
Act, the expressed purpose of which is to require 
records to be maintained because they “have a high 
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degree of usefulness in criminal tax, and regulatory 
investigations and proceedings.”274 
 
The Court’s line of reasoning here is inappropriate because it allows 
Congress to dictate citizens’ Fourth Amendment protections. This 
system is akin to the fox in the henhouse analogy because Congress 
could abrogate any Fourth Amendment protection by merely 
passing a statute declaring that individuals no longer have a privacy 
interest in the subject matter.   
Interestingly, the Supreme Court began this line of thinking 
regarding the BSA not in Miller, but three years earlier in Shultz. 
While describing the “sweeping” effect of the BSA in Shultz, the 
Court said,  
 
While an Act conferring such broad authority over 
transactions such as these might well surprise or even 
shock those who lived in an earlier era, the latter did 
not live to see the time when bank accounts would 
join chocolate, cheese, and watches as a symbol of 
the Swiss economy. Nor did they live to see the 
heavy utilization of our domestic banking system by 
the minions of organized crime as well as by millions 
of legitimate businessmen.275 
 
Here, the court implied that individuals should give up privacy for 
the sake of criminal investigations.  
 These errors in reasoning call into doubt the Court’s holding 
in Miller. If the Court avoided these errors, it may have determined 
that the BSA was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment—
or at least it would have been a much closer case. Either way, these 
errors severely limit Miller’s precedential value and calls for the 
Court to revisit the issue. In 2017, ruling that the BSA in its current 
form violates the Fourth Amendment seems unavoidable.  
Nevertheless, such a ruling would not necessarily ring the 
BSA’s death-bell; it only means that the BSA is unconstitutional to 
the extent that it allows the government to collect personal 
information to investigate criminal acts, determined by a Katz 
analysis, without a warrant. The Court would have to strike 
provisions such as the mandatory reporting of SARs for the BSA to 
be constitutional. Further, any information-collecting portions of the 
BSA that are not specifically geared towards criminal investigation 
would not even fall under the purview of the Fourth Amendment in 
the first place.276  
 
274 Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43. 
275 California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). 
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IV. REEVALUATING THE BSA UNDER THE  
FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE MODERN ERA 
 
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court correctly decided 
Miller in 1976, society has since sufficiently changed to demand that 
the Supreme Court now overturn Miller. Particularly in the digital 
age, the third-party doctrine should not operate to deny Fourth 
Amendment protection of banking information categorically. “It 
would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to 
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by 
the advances of technology.”277 The expectation that Fourth 
Amendment protections can change over time is supported by how 
the Supreme Court describes its Katz decision as a rejection of a 
“mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment” because “that 
approach would leave [individuals] at the mercy of advancing 
technology . . . ”278 Under this approach to constitutionally protected 
privacy rights, the Supreme Court should not rigidly apply Fourth 
Amendment doctrines developed in historically dissimilar contexts 
in modern cases.  
Several realities of modern society and technological 
advances support a finding that society has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in banking records. In the modern era, a person’s bank 
account can reveal the intimacies of that person’s life.279 As one 
scholar has noted, the depth of this information is great: 
 
With access to an individual's financial records, 
interested parties can easily determine the groups and 
associations to which the individual belongs (e.g., 
through membership dues or contributions) and the 
social causes the individual supports (e.g., through 
contributions). With access to banking records, 
interested parties can identify the books and 
publications an individual buys (e.g., through 
subscription payments or receipts) and the material 
items an individual purchases (e.g., through receipts 
or credit charges). Prying eyes with access to bank 
records can even identify the political party and 
causes supported by the individual (e.g., through 
 
277 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).  
278 Id. at 35. 
279 Matthew N. Kleiman, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized 
Law Enforcement: A New Fight In An Old Battle, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1176 
(1992).  
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contributions to an election campaign or to a 
lobbying group).280 
 
Moreover, this reasoning is not restricted to that of academics—the 
Supreme Court has previously echoed such sentiments.   
 The Supreme Court has already recognized that it is 
precisely this type of information and activity that the Constitution 
protects. In National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. 
State of Ala. ex. rel. Patterson, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
“[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many 
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of 
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident 
beliefs.”281 Similarly, in Talley v. California, the Supreme Court 
recognized that anonymity in personal participation in political 
discourse and activities is necessary to the freedom of people from 
governmental tyranny.282 This principle is ingrained in the rise of 
our nation—anonymous distribution of literature critical of the 
British, which the British considered a criminal act, was part of the 
prelude to the Revolutionary War.283 Further, the Supreme Court has 
recognized significant privacy expectations barring governmental 
intrusion into individuals’ sexual and family lives, such as privacy 
in marriage, procreation, family relationships, child-rearing, child 
education, possession of pornography in the home, and 
contraceptive use.284 
 Moreover, as the United States moves closer to a cashless 
society where all financial transactions are conducted by computer 
recordkeeping, debit and credit card transactions can be used to map 
an individual’s physical movements.285 This tracking capability can 
be expanded to identify groups of people meeting together.286  
 Under these realities, there are two reasons to hold that the 
BSA is unconstitutional. First, banks have become government 
agents. In a society that both requires banking and government 
disclosure of banking records, banks are de facto arms of the federal 
government engaged in continuous surveillance of its citizens.287 
 
280 Id. 
281 National Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Ala. ex. rel. 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).  
282 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960).  
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Second, recent financial developments demonstrate that citizens 
demand privacy in banking. Specifically, the massive rise of 
cryptocurrencies288—a financial mechanism designed to protect 
privacy—is society’s revolt against the BSA.   
 
A. To Participate in Society, the BSA Effectively 
Requires Individuals to Give the Federal 
Government Private Information. 
 
The combination of detailed and vague reporting 
requirements for banks within the BSA forces banks to overreport 
on the transactions of their customers. This is out of fear of sanctions 
for noncompliance. Concurrently, in the modern age, banking is 
necessary for individuals to participate in society effectively. The 
result of this paradigm requires citizens to give the government free 
access to their financial records—such revelations are anything but 
voluntary. Consequently, the third-party doctrine under the Katz test 
is inapplicable. The Katz test recognizes that the Fourth Amendment 
may protect some third-party disclosures. A court cannot hold that 
individuals voluntarily relinquish privacy expectations in the 
information given to third parties when the government requires 
those disclosures.  
 
1. Banks as Government Agents 
 
The Fourth Amendment applies to agents of the federal 
government.289 The circuit courts have identified “two critical 
factors” in determining whether a private entity acts as a government 
agent: “(1) whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the 
intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the search 
intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own 
ends.”290 The courts also consider other cicrumstances, such as 
whether a search is performed at the request of the government or 
whether the government offered a reward for the search.291 
 
applicable punishments only serve to bolster the argument that the federal 
government has coopted banks as its agents.  
288 See infra Part IV.B; “Cryptocurrency” is defined by Merriam-Webster as “any 
form of currency that only exists digitally, that usually has no central issuing or 
regulating authority but instead uses a decentralized system to record transactions 
and manage the issuance of new units, and that relies on cryptography to prevent 
counterfeiting and fraudulent transactions.” 
289 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 179, 177 (1984).  
290 United States v. Blocker, 104 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Malbrough, 922 
F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
291 Malbrough, 922 F.2d at 462 (citing United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 
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Under these rules, the BSA turns banks into government 
agents. Not only does the government know banks are keeping 
customers’ banking records for use in criminal investigations, but 
the government also requires it.292 In this same manner, the banks 
are keeping transaction records and sending many of those records, 
including SARs, to FinCEN expressly for the criminal-investigation 
ends of the BSA.293 To ensure compliance with the BSA, the 
government both offersrewards and threatens punishment.294 These 
“critical” factors all point to banks as being government agents.  
In Shultz, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the 
BSA turns banks into government agents.295 The Court reasoned 
because the records that the BSA requires banks to keep were 
already being kept voluntarily by the banks for their business 
purposes and that it is a party in banking transactions, a statute 
requiring banks to keep the same records does not transform the 
banks into government agents.296 The Supreme Court determined 
that this situation was not any different from its prior holding that 
the IRS summons directed at banks for records did not violate the 
customers’ Fourth Amendment protections.297 Further, in Miller, the 
Supreme Court insisted that even if it assumed the banks were acting 
as government agents under the BSA, there could be no Fourth 
Amendment violation due to the third-party doctrine.298  
The Supreme Court’s arguments do not follow. As the 
Supreme Court itself admitted in Miller, the banks’ practice of 
keeping permanent records was on the decline in recent years.299 
Moreover, SARs are reports designed for the benefit of the 
government—banks do not create them during standard business 
practices of banking.300 Since the BSA requires banks to keep 
records they may not have otherwise kept and then requires that the 
records be available to the government for criminal investigations, 
the BSA squarely imparts government agency onto banks. Banks 
acting as government agents is particularly troublesome when 
individuals must choose between disclosing information to the 
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2. No Option but to Bank 
 
Technological progress in modern society gives the public 
no option but to hold bank accounts. The third-party doctrine 
emerged in a society that was then mostly cash-based. In that 
system, an individual did not necessarily have (much less need) a 
bank account. It was easier to believe that individuals giving 
information to banks were doing so voluntarily. Today, individuals 
primarily receive and send payments electronically—an act that 
requires banks to function as necessary intermediaries. As 
highlighted in Airel’s story,301 it is unduly burdensome to function 
in modern society without a bank account.302 
The Supreme Court of California recognized the need for 
bank accounts in 1975,  declaring “[f]or all practical purposes, the 
disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs 
to a bank is not entirely volitional since it is impossible to participate 
in the economic life of contemporary society without maintaining a 
bank account.”303 For those choosing to live without bank accounts, 
there are limited options for making and receiving payments. These 
options are restricted to using prepaid cards or paper currency, and 
each of these options comes with its own disadvantages.304 While 
prepaid cards do allow for individuals to make online purchases just 
like bank-issued credit and debit cards, money stored in accounts for 
prepaid cards are not necessarily insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).305 One of the requirements for 
insurance is that the owner of the prepaid card must be identified.306 
For individuals seeking to avoid the BSA’s reporting requirements, 
they must forego FDIC insurance as the requisite identification 
would result in BSA surveillance.307 Further, assuming the operators 
of these prepaid cards are money transmitters, the amount of money 
loaded onto the card can itself trigger a required SAR under the 
BSA.308 
The sole use of paper currency also comes with 
disadvantages. First, possessing only paper currency can pose a 
safety issue. Homes and people are subject to burglary. Money kept 
 
301 See supra Part I.A.  
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at home is additionally subject to destruction, such as from fires. If 
paper currency is stolen by an unknown individual or destroyed, 
there is no getting it back. Even if an individual has a method to 
safeguard his or her cash, it still does not accrue interest as it would 
when locked in a bank’s vault. 
Users of only paper currency are also disadvantaged in 
receiving and making payments. Without a bank account and unless 
an employer pays in cash, these individuals will require check 
cashing services.309 These services typically charge fees above what 
one would have to pay when receiving a direct deposit into their 
bank account.310 For example, an individual wishing to cash a check 
at a non-bank entity is usually charged “between 1.5% and 3.3% of 
[the] check’s face value.”311 If that same individual wants to send a 
money order, for amounts under $500, that individual will typically 
face fees ranging from $0.50 to $10, or up to ten percent of the 
money order’s value.312 
Likewise, if a debtor, such as a utility company, does not 
have a local office that accepts cash payments, the individual must 
get and send a money order, which also comes with fees.313 
Furthermore, payments made by paper currency do not help improve 
an individual’s credit score.314 This is significant because credit 
scores do not only affect an individual’s ability to make large 
purchases, but employers are entitled to look at credit scores to make 
hiring and promotion decisions.315 
Still, individuals remain “unbanked.” The FDIC considered 
a household to be “unbanked” when “no one in the household had a 
checking or savings account.” In response, the Government has 
taken multiple steps to get unbanked individuals signed up for 
banking services. The Government has been trying this even before 
the FDIC began its survey program in 2009 where it tried to quantify 
the number of unbanked and underbanked households in the United 
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States.316 For example, in 1998, Congress passed the Assets for 
Independence Act (AFIA), which provided $125 million in federal 
funds to local programs aimed at getting individuals to sign-up for 
Individual Development Accounts.317  
Statistical analysis on the number of individuals who do not 
have bank accounts is a recent development but does provide some 
interesting insights. Starting in 2011, The World Bank estimated 
that 22% of United States citizens over fifteen years old did not have 
a bank account.318 In that same year, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System estimated that 10.8% of United States 
citizens were unbanked.319 Four years later in 2015, a national 
survey by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) found 
that 7% of United States households were unbanked.320 The 2015 
survey results demonstrated only a small decrease in unbanked 
households since the FDIC’s 2013 survey, and found that 7.7% of 
households were unbanked.321  
Nevertheless, the 2015 survey also asked the unbanked 
individuals why they do not have bank accounts. The following 
were respondents most stated reasons: (1) they do not have enough 
money to keep in a bank account by 57.4% of respondents, (2) 
avoiding banks provides more privacy by 28.5% of respondents, and 
(3) they do not trust banks by 28% of respondents.322 
The government’s success in this endeavor is demonstrated 
by the shrinking numbers of unbanked Americans. However, the 
desire for financial privacy is demonstrated by the high number of 
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unbanked individuals reporting that their unbanked status was due 
to privacy concerns and a lack of trust in banks. Technological 
advances are allowing these individuals (and even the currently 
banked) to take advantage of services traditionally provided by 
banks while foregoing the use of banks and incurring lower fees. 
The rise of these technologies supports society’s reasonable 
expectation for privacy in banking. Of all these technologices, 
cryptocurrencies make a particularly strong case.  
 
B. Cryptocurrencies and the Rise Of Privacy Coins 
 
Cryptocurrencies—and the more secrecy-focused “privacy 
coins”—provide a large degree of anonymity to their users.323 While 
critics of cryptocurrencies argue that they are merely a vehicle for 
illegal activity such as money-laundering, cryptocurrency adopters 
assert that “embracing privacy and anonymity doesn’t mean you’re 
a criminal; it just simply means that you’re redeeming your rights to 
have absolute control over your own privacy.324 If this is the case, 
the BSA cannot survive the Katz test.  
 
1. Cryptocurrency Technology and Privacy Coins 
 
FinCEN defines “currency” as “the coin and paper money of 
the United States or of any other country that [i] is designated as 
legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is customarily used as a 
medium of exchange in the country of issuance.”325 Conversely, 
FinCEN defines “virtual” currency as “a medium of exchange that 
operates like a currency in some environments but does not have all 
the attributes of real currency. Virtual currency does not have legal 
tender status in any jurisdiction.”326 Cryptocurrencies fall under the 
latter category as they are a type of encrypted, electronic semi-
currencies that act as a medium of exchange in a largely anonymous 
environment. The public’s rapidly increasing adoption of 
cryptocurrencies is a significant sign that individuals want—and in 
practice, expect—privacy in their financial transactions. 
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[https://perma.cc/5AY9-8WH9] (quoting 31 CFR § 1010.100(m)). 
326 Id.  




The first major cryptocurrency introduced to the public was 
Bitcoin in 2009, and as of 2019, it remains the most valuable 
cryptocurrency on the market.327 Bitcoin, like all other 
cryptocurrencies, is a virtual currency that only exists in electronic 
form.328 Cryptocurrencies are unique in that financial transactions 
are not recorded in a central location, and users’ identities are kept 
anonymous.329 Rather, the transactions are processed and logged on 
a decentralized public ledger—many independent computers and 
servers working in parallel, each keeping a separate, immutable 
copy of each transaction.330 These independent computers and 
servers are incentivized to lending their processing power to this 
system by having a chance to earn fees for their participation.331 
 On the users’ end, cryptocurrency transfers may be made 
without having to reveal any personally identifiable information.332 
The transactions recorded on the public ledger only include the 
amounts involved in that transaction and an equivalent of an account 
number for each party involved.333 These account numbers are a 
randomly generated set of numbers and letters—they do not in and 
of themselves identify the account’s owner.334 However, because the 
ledger is public, account numbers are available to anyone so inclined 
to look up a particular account’s full history of money sent and 
received.335 Thus, a user risks identification by using 
cryptocurrencies to purchase traceable goods, which then can reveal 
that users’ entire transactional history.336 Several alternative 
cryptocurrencies have emerged to solve this identification problem.    
 Improving upon this privacy, several cryptocurrencies have 
been developed to ensure anonymity in cryptocurrency-based 
financial transactions; these cryptocurrencies have earned the 
moniker “privacy coins.”337 Notable privacy coins include Monero, 
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Zcash, Dash, Verge, PIVX, and Hush, each taking advantage of 
different technologies to shield their users’ identities.338 For 
example, Monero arguably offers the highest degree of financial 
anonymity.339 In a brief explanation of its technologies, Monero 
uses Ring Confidential Transactions (RCT) and Stealth Addresses 
to mask the accounts of both senders and receivers as well as the 
amount involved.340 RCT anonymizes the identities of senders by 
comingling a number of senders for any one particular transaction, 
so it is impossible to distinguish the actual sender for a particular 
transaction.341  
Further, RCT hides the actual amount being sent by 
requiring the sender to transfer more than required and receiving 
back the excess amount as “change.”342 This is done through “a 
cryptographic proof that the sum of the input amounts is the same 
as the sum of the output amounts, without revealing the actual 
numbers.”343 Finally, the Stealth Address component of Monero 
works by publishing the sender’s side of a transaction on the 
blockchain—the receiver is not specified.344 Rather, each transfer is 
routed to a unique, one-time-use address on the blockchain.345 A 
receiver wishing to use the received money gains a one-use private 
key to identify his or her funds on the public ledger and send them 
to a new address.346 This whole process is done without the receiver 
ever having to publish any information on the publicly-viewable 
ledger.347 The technology advanced by Monero is but one example 
of innovation looking to keep financial transactions private.  
 
2. Cryptocurrencies As A Sign Of Expectations To 
Privacy In Financial Transactions 
 
While some try, estimating the number of cryptocurrency 
holders is difficult.348 Still, the explosive growth of cryptocurrencies 
in such a short time and on a global scale is a sign that individuals 
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speculation, have contributed to the rise of cryptocurrencies,349 but 
the promise of financial privacy cannot be overlooked—privacy was 
one of Bitcoin’s founding principles after all.350  
On a global scale, Bitcoin’s number of users has drastically 
increased over the past five years.351 In January 2015, there were 
approximately 2.8 million users; by the end of 2019, that number 
was approaching 50 million.352 For all types of cryptocurrencies, a 
2017 University of Cambridge, Judge Business School study 
estimated that there are between 2.9 million and 5.8 million unique 
cryptocurrency users.353 Yet, even since the release of this study, the 
number of cryptocurrency users are likely to drastically increase as 
cryptocurrency exchanges report ever-growing numbers of 
accounts. After the Cambridge study was released, Coinbase, one of 
the world’s biggest cryptocurrency exchanges, announced that on a 
single day it saw the registration of 40,000 additional customers.354 
Even ancillary services for cryptocurrencies are emerging. For 
example, by September 1, 2019, there were 3,571 Bitcoin ATMs 
located in the United States.355 Monero has seen gains even more 
impressive than Bitcoin. In 2016, the price of Bitcoin doubled; that 
same year, the price of Monero grew by 2,760%.356 
 The trend towards cryptocurrencies is undeniable and there 
is a proven market for privacy coins. Individuals require banking 
services, but those services disclose private financial information to 
the government because of the BSA. If need is the mother of all 
inventions, the rise of cryptocurrencies shows that society is trying 
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to reclaim financial privacy. Under the Katz test, this means that 
society recognizes financial privacy as reasonable, thus, requiring 
the BSA conform with Fourth Amendment principles. A 
foundational principle of the Fourth Amendment is that warrantless 
searches and seizures are unreasonable. The BSA allows the 
government to obtain financial information from banks in the 
absence of a warrant. Accordingly, the BSA violates the Fourth 




The Supreme Court should reevaluate the BSA under the 
Fourth Amendment and provide a robust Katz-test analysis. In 
Miller, the Court erroneously reasoned that the BSA’s reporting 
requirements did not violate Fourth Amendment privacy 
expectations. The court erred by misinterpreting the line of cases 
creating the third-party doctrine and therefore applied the rule as 
constructed under the overruled trespass-doctrine. This error has 
caused the Court to view an individual’s disclosure of information 
to a third party as a bright-line rule: because individuals voluntarily 
provide information to banks, they forfeit any privacy expectation 
in that information. Instead, the Court should have given full 
consideration to the Katz test, which allows for the possibility of 
Fourth Amendment protection over information shared with third 
parties.    
Regardless of the Court’s decision in Miller, the Katz test 
open parameters provide changing Fourth Amendment protections 
over time. Applying the Katz test to the BSA in the modern era 
shows that the BSA is unconstitutional. Certainly, society should 
recognize an individual’s privacy expectation in banking 
information as reasonable. The individual is not strictly 
“voluntarily” providing that information to his or her bank because 
the burden of living without a bank account is extreme. Moreover, 
the rise of cryptocurrencies is an indicator that society expects 
privacy in banking information. A central vision of cryptocurrencies 
is user anonymity and autonomy in financial information. Society’s 
desire for anonymity and autonomy excludes its acceptance of the 
BSA. Therefore, the Supreme Court should take the opportunity to 
reexamine the BSA and hold that its reporting requirements violate 
the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
